Reaching Critical Will’s Guide to 2010

A briefing book for the 2010 NPT Review Conference
Guide to 2010

Reaching Critical Will’s briefing book
for the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

3–28 May 2010, New York City

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Understanding the NPT

The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) opened for signature on 1 July 1968, and entered into force on 5 March 1970. 189 states have ratified the NPT, becoming “states parties” to the Treaty. India, Israel, and Pakistan have not signed or ratified the Treaty and have developed nuclear weapons since its entry into force. North Korea did ratify the Treaty but announced its withdrawal in 2003.

The NPT divides all state parties into two groups: those that tested nuclear weapons before 1 January 1967 and those that did not. The states that tested nuclear weapons before 1967 are known as official “nuclear weapon states” and consists of the United States, Russia (originally the Soviet Union), China, France, and the United Kingdom. The second group is known as non-nuclear weapon states.

The NPT’s main impetus was stopping the potential rapid proliferation of nuclear weapons to a high number of states. Therefore, the Treaty provides a “grand bargain” for non-nuclear weapon states: that in exchange for their commitment to never develop or receive nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapon states promised to eliminate their arsenals and that non-nuclear weapon states would have access to the “peaceful uses” of nuclear technology.

Summary of the articles

Article I: Nuclear weapon states will not transfer nuclear weapons, nor will they assist in the development of nuclear weapons in any way.

Article II: Non-nuclear weapon states will not acquire nuclear weapons, nor will they manufacture such weapons.

Article III: Non-nuclear weapon states will accept inspection of their civilian nuclear energy plants by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the form of such inspections shall be negotiated by each state and the IAEA in additional protocols.

Article IV: Nothing in this Treaty shall impede states parties “inalienable right” to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Article V: Benefits from peaceful nuclear explosions should be shared all around (this article has been superseded by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty).

Article VI: Each party to the Treaty is obliged to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at and early date and to nuclear disarmament. States parties also agree to pursue a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Article VII: Nothing in the Treaty can stop nuclear weapon free zones from being negotiated.

Article VIII: Sets up procedure for amendments of the Treaty and for the review process.

Article XI: The Treaty is open for all countries, and it will enter into force when the US, UK, USSR and 40 other states have ratified it. The definition of a nuclear weapon state is one that has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

Article X: Each party has the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events have jeopardized the interest of the country. A three months notice of withdrawal must be given to all states parties of the treaty and the United Nations Security Council.

Article XI: The Treaty is available in English, Russian, French, Spanish, and Chinese and all languages are equally authentic.

Previous reviews of the Treaty


In 1995, the Review Conference decided to extend the Treaty past its initial 25 years, it is now an indefinite Treaty. States parties also agreed to a package of decisions, including a resolution calling for a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East.

In 2000, states parties at the Review Conference adopted thirteen progressive and systematic steps to implement the nuclear disarmament obligation in the Treaty and the decisions reached at the 1995 Conference.

In 2005, states parties failed to agree on an outcome document, largely because of disagreement between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states, with the former emphasizing the importance of strengthening nonproliferation efforts and focusing on specific cases of actual and suspected non-compliance with the Treaty, and the latter emphasizing the importance of compliance with and implementation of past disarmament obligations.
The 2010 Review Conference

Organization of the Review Conference

The work of the Review Conference is divided up into three main committees. Each committee will likely have a subsidiary body focusing on one of its subjects more in depth.

Main Committee I: Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security, including: Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3; Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12; Article VII, with specific reference to the main issues considered in this Committee; United Nations Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995); negative security assurances.

Main Committee II: Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weaponfree zones, including: Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7; Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3 in their relationship to articles III and IV; Article VII.

Main Committee III: Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II, including: Articles III (3) and IV, preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to article III (1), (2) and (4) and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5; Article V; other provisions of the Treaty.

What’s on the table?

The Review Conference in 2010 is an opportunity to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and to make progress on nuclear disarmament, but it faces many obstacles. Recent developments, such as the conclusion of new START and high-level rhetoric in favour of a nuclear weapon free world, have lead to growing expectations for new opportunities for nuclear disarmament. However, many challenges and difficulties still remain and the NPT Review Conference must address many controversial and other issues, including:

- concrete steps for nuclear disarmament;
- measures to strengthen non-proliferation objectives;
- universality of the Treaty;
- implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East;
- issues related to access to nuclear technology;
- measures to address withdrawal from the Treaty;
- measures to further strengthen the review process.

“Balancing” non-proliferation and disarmament

The obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons has a beginning and end. Nuclear weapon states are required to begin negotiations on nuclear disarmament and to conclude by getting rid of their arsenals. The non-proliferation requirements, in contrast, are ongoing. There is no end point. Nuclear and non-nuclear states are often in conflict over this issue. Nuclear weapon states assert that they have gone far enough in implementing article VI of the Treaty (their disarmament obligation) and that everyone else has to commit to stricter non-proliferation measures in order to strengthen the Treaty regime. However, most states that do not possess nuclear weapons note that: a) nuclear weapon states have not engaged in multilateral negotiations to eliminate their nuclear arsenals; and that b) so far, bilateral or unilateral reductions in weapons or force status have been accompanied by modernization or increased investment in nuclear weapon programmes, which undermines the reductions and perpetually delays disarmament.

Debate has been characterized by a divide between those states which advocate strongly for measures to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and those which call for concrete action on nuclear disarmament. The result has been what former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan referred to as “mutually assured paralysis”.

Suggested talking points: Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measures need to be pursued simultaneously. New and innovative steps (not just reaffirmation of past commitments) on both disarmament and non-proliferation are required. The commitment to disarm must be demonstrated by verifiable, irreversible, and transparent reductions of nuclear weapons and must not be conditioned upon further investment in nuclear weapon programmes or modernization/refurbishment of the existing stockpiles. The Review Conference should call for the initiation of preparatory work for a nuclear weapons convention or framework agreement as a way to ensure full implementation of the NPT.

Universalization of the Treaty

In 1995, states parties affirmed that universal
adherence to the Treaty is an urgent priority. They have routinely called on India, Israel, and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states, which none are willing to do under present circumstances.

**Suggested talking point:*** States parties should emphasize that there are fundamental principles of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation that are universal in scope, which could be drawn from the preamble of the NPT. On this basis, the Review Conference could invite all non-party states to apply comprehensive IAEA safeguards on all their civilian nuclear activities, cease manufacturing nuclear weapons and related materials, and join in negotiations of a nuclear weapons convention.

**NWFZ in the Middle East**

The issue of universalization is also connected to the resolution on the Middle East that was agreed upon in 1995, in which state parties decided to work for a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East. Many states in the region argue that not enough is done to bring Israel into this process or to establish this zone. During this review cycle, the Egyptian delegation has suggested that the NPT convene an international conference in 2011, which would negotiate the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East, and appoint a standing committee of NPT officials to make preparations and conduct regional consultations.

**Suggested talking point:*** States parties should agree at this RevCon to convene an international conference on the Middle East to launch negotiations on Middle East nuclear weapon free zone, involving all states of the region and other key players.

**Nuclear energy and fuel cycle**

Most NPT states parties want to preserve their access to nuclear technology for “peaceful purposes” and their right to develop aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle for these purposes, which are guaranteed by article IV of the Treaty. However, some states are worried about the dangers of proliferation and the safety of nuclear materials associated with each country having indigenous fuel cycle capacities. Proposals are on the table for “multilateralizing” the fuel cycle but some developing countries are worried this will limit their access to nuclear fuel for political reasons.

**Suggested talking point:*** Governments should work for establishment of a multilateral framework for the production of nuclear fuel that precludes the construction of nationally-controlled fuel cycle facilities and transitions existing facilities to international control, pending the phase-out of nuclear power. This should be done in a way that does not allow for politicization of nuclear fuel access. At the same time, because of the health, environmental, and proliferation risks of nuclear energy, governments and industry should phase-out nuclear energy and increase their support for the development of commercially viable renewable and non-carbon emitting sources of energy. Governments should cease their promotion of nuclear power.

**Withdrawal**

Many states are interested in elaborating appropriate responses to Treaty withdrawals, especially concerning how to deal with nuclear material received for peaceful purposes as a non-nuclear weapon state. However, some governments see the focus on withdrawal as an effort to take away their sovereign rights to withdraw from the Treaty.

**Suggested talking point:*** States parties should ensure the long-term viability of the Treaty by addressing root causes of nuclear proliferation, including by solving regional issues, ending security policies based on the contagious doctrine of nuclear deterrence, and take concrete steps to achieve universal adherence to the treaty.

**Strengthening the review process**

Some states parties argue that there is a lack of institutional support for the NPT and that the strengthened review process, instituted in 1995, has not fully lived up to its promises. They suggest that a standing secretariat and other initiatives could assist in implementing decisions and strengthen the NPT regime. As opposed to other WMD treaties like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the NPT does not have a secretariat or support unit to carry on the work of implementing the Treaty in between Review Conferences. Furthermore, there is limited continuity between review cycle chairs and the preparatory committees currently do not take decisions or carry forward substantive work in between sessions, which means the Treaty can only take action every five years.

**Suggested talking point:*** States parties should strengthen the institutional capacity of the NPT by establishing an annual cycle of short meetings (which would have decision-making authorities), increase continuity between review cycles, and consider ways to increase support for the UN to provide support for the meetings of states parties.
Recommendations from Beyond arms control: challenges and choices for nuclear disarmament

In the lead-up to the 2010 Review Conference, Reaching Critical Will coordinated, edited, and published a book by twenty-five non-governmental experts who critically examine the mainstream discourse of nuclear weapons, highlighting the prospects and potential pitfalls for nuclear disarmament in the current world order.

The following recommendations have been pulled from this book, Beyond arms control: challenges and choices for nuclear disarmament.

Recommendations on modernization and investment in nuclear weapons

- If the danger of nuclear war is to be eliminated, ceasing to plan and build for an eternal nuclear threat must come early, not late, in the process, and it will have to be linked to a more general demilitarization and demobilization of US, Russian, European, and other major military forces. Therefore:
  » All states possessing nuclear arsenals should halt research, development, testing, and component production while reductions of arsenals are in progress, not afterwards.
  » They should also declare that they will not design, develop, or produce new-design nuclear warheads, or modify or modernize existing warheads to add military capabilities.
  » Relevant production and research facilities should be subjected to an intrusive verification regime at the earliest possible time.
- Civil society and government leadership in non-nuclear weapon states need to recognize the dangers of uncritically endorsing the rhetorical “vision” espoused by the Obama administration, four horsemen, and other nuclear elites, and instead push forward a concrete agenda for nuclear disarmament to be pursued in tandem with non-proliferation measures. Within this concrete agenda for nuclear disarmament, these actors should recognize the paradoxically pro-nuclear weapon aims of the United States that can be accomplished through ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) or the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) under current conditions.
- Taking this into account, disarmament NGOs in the United States and other nuclear weapon states should rigorously oppose funding for nuclear weapons research, design, and production and should oppose construction of any new nuclear weapons complex facilities as a condition of CTBT or START ratification. If this cannot be accomplished, perhaps it would be best to forgo ratification of these treaties entirely, focusing instead on budget and infrastructure developments within nuclear weapon states.

Recommendations on the elimination of nuclear weapons

- Nuclear-armed governments should reaffirm the NPT unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenals and reaffirm the principles of transparency, verification, and accountability in fulfilling disarmament obligations and agreements. They should commit to regular reporting on nuclear warhead and delivery system arsenals, fissile material stockpiles, spending on nuclear forces, and steps and plans for disarmament.
- Nuclear-armed states should reduce nuclear arsenals in a manner that supports concurrent general disarmament of “conventional” forces.
- The US and Russian governments should reduce their arsenals on their own in a transparent and verified manner. To build a more stable bilateral relationship, and to move toward global nuclear disarmament, unilateral and bilateral reductions should achieve the following:
  » maintain transparency and predictability;
  » mandate steady reductions in all nuclear warheads, deployed and reserve, strategic and non-strategic;
  » mandate reductions in strategic delivery systems, whether for nuclear or non-nuclear weapons, and prohibit multiple warhead missiles;
  » require verified dismantlement of all excess warheads and delivery mechanisms;
  » provide for international monitoring in addition to bilateral verification, to establish accountability to the entire community of states; and
  » reach levels of total warheads low enough to allow the next phase to encompass other states possessing nuclear arsenals. All warheads—deployed, spare, reserve, awaiting dismantlement, etc.—must be counted in the total. The total likely will need to be in the hundreds on each side to attract meaningful participation from other possessor states, which should be consulted on this key point.
- All governments should:
  » renounce and/or oppose nuclear sharing arrangements and “extended nuclear deterrence”;
  » commit to preparatory work for a nuclear weapons convention or framework agreement.
- Citizens should encourage their governments to work...
towards a nuclear weapons convention (NWC) and educate each other about the benefits of abolishing nuclear weapons globally. Civil society groups should push the goal of a NWC into the mainstream and onto the negotiating agenda, where they can engage with governments on the legal, technical, and political aspects of such a convention. Before the Review Conference, civil society groups should push governments to identify the need for some sort of nuclear prohibition treaty in their statements and working papers. After the Review Conference, civil society groups should participate in the Nuclear Abolition Action Day on 5 June 2010 to inspire and keep up the momentum for a NWC.

- The NWC and the elimination of nuclear weapons must be grounded in a broader movement toward political, economic, and social justice and equity in which the majority of the world’s people are empowered to live a healthy, dignified, and productive life. The elimination of nuclear weapons must serve as the leading edge of a global trend towards demilitarization and redirection of military expenditures to meet human needs and restore the environment.
- When thinking about their work, government representatives working on nuclear disarmament issues should consider what might be learned from recent international initiatives to address the human impacts of other weapons. These include the Ottawa and Oslo processes on antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions respectively, which each “reframed” the discourse and acceptability of these weapons in broader terms than before. Although these are, of course, very different from the nuclear disarmament context, focusing on evidence of the human impacts of weapons alongside their purported military advantages or technical characteristics, engaging civil society, shifting the burden of proof for the continued acceptability of a weapon onto users and producers, and building legitimacy through inclusion of a diverse range of actors were all important to success on these issues. These factors also helped in overcoming the obstacles in traditional multilateral forums preventing effective progress in addressing the problems the existence and use of such weapons create.
- Civil society actors should also consider lessons from other international initiatives to deal with armed violence, with attention to those related to campaigning and building alliances. Gaps between various communities, like those between practitioners active in disarmament and those working in areas such as development, public health, and the environment should be bridged. Greater informal dialogue and a common vocabulary would help.
- Both governments and civil society should develop a discourse that draws attention to the impact of the development, production, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons rather than accepting untested claims or assumptions favouring inertia.

**Recommendations on nuclear sharing**
- NATO’s non-nuclear members should cease equipping their aircraft and training to use US nuclear weapons in times of war. This would be timely and economically attractive, since all nuclear sharing nations must replace their aging fleets of aircraft over the next decade, and could use this opportunity to reorient defence budgets while giving up the anachronistic nuclear role.
- As part of its Strategic Concept review, NATO should remove US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe and end the policies of nuclear sharing and deterrence based on the potential first use of nuclear weapons. NATO should use this decision in a leverage strategy to persuade Russia to mothball and eliminate its tactical nuclear forces as well.
- These actions should be publicly announced to contribute to a positive atmosphere at the NPT. NATO members should then initiate a further programme of action to strengthen the NPT, including committing to the goal of a nuclear weapon free world and practical steps to achieve this aim.
- To begin this process, at the 2010 Review Conference, NPT states should strengthen the Treaty by declaring that it is binding on all state parties “under any circumstances”. NATO member states should issue a joint declaration accepting this and stating their intention to comply promptly.
- The US and UK governments should end their exchange of nuclear weapons information and materials in the interest of respecting their obligations under the NPT and promoting rather than deterring disarmament and non-proliferation.
- Other governments and civil society should hold the US and UK governments accountable to their obligations under the NPT and should encourage the US and UK governments to promote disarmament by ending their nuclear sharing arrangements.
- The US and UK governments should instead increase their collaboration on verification, non-proliferation, and disarmament technologies.

**Recommendations on nuclear energy**
- Governments should increase their support for development of commercially viable renewable and non-carbon emitting sources of energy, and for energy conservation. They should join the International Renewable Energy Agency and work for a rapid transition to the widespread and sustainable use of renewable energy worldwide.
• Governments should work for establishment of a multilateral framework for the production of nuclear fuel that precludes the construction of nationally-controlled fuel cycle facilities and transitions existing facilities to international control, pending the phase-out of nuclear power.
• Governments and industry should phase-out nuclear power and refrain from promoting nuclear power as a means to combat climate change.
• Decisions about the expansion of nuclear power should be made with the explicit understanding that the technology used to generate nuclear electricity is intrinsically, and under the present circumstances, inextricably, linked to the ability to make nuclear weapons.
• Actors should refrain from engaging in trade and cooperation on nuclear power technologies that flout carefully crafted non-proliferation norms, which will only strengthen the linkage between nuclear power and nuclear weapons.
• NPT member states should establish an explicit prohibition on nuclear cooperation with non-states parties.
• Governments should focus efforts on developing decentralized and local sources of energy rather than promoting nuclear power, which is not the most efficient form of energy for poor populations. Decentralized and local sources of energy also provide a better chance of building an environmentally sustainable, socially equitable world, empowering the majority to live a healthy dignified and productive life.
• Citizens should work with each other and their governments to promote a carbon-free, nuclear-free future: see www.carbonfreenuclearfree.org for information and ideas.

**Recommendations on creating a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East**

• Governments in the region need to undergo a renewed assessment of the threats they perceive from each other and of the best approaches to defusing these threats. They should address each other’s prevailing concerns with an aim to bolstering confidence that their security concerns can be addressed through the political process and show flexibility to create a real political opening. As a starting point, all governments in the region should make unilateral categorical commitments to no possession or no first use of WMD.
• Outside powers also have a responsibility in identifying and solving these threat perceptions and should particularly focus on avoiding doublestandards, inconsistent policies, and practices that contribute to conflict in the region.

• Any country considering a nuclear power programme should undertake a comprehensive and critical review of potential proliferation, economic, environmental, and health consequences, as well as alternatives such as renewable energy. The potential contribution of wind and solar energy sources in the Middle East deserve increased support for research and development.
• All governments should examine the possibility of a verified suspension of their fuel cycle activities as a confidence-building measure, including the exploration of creative verification mechanisms that prevent the disclosure of sensitive or proliferation-prone information while establishing and maintaining confidence in adherence to commitments.
• The political peace process should provide opportunities for addressing the human, social, and psychological elements that undermine security, including the opportunity to voice historical grievances. For example, governments and/or non-governmental organizations could establish a forum for airing past injustices; identify mechanisms for the promotion of social development and human rights; and undertake joint economic programmes around sustainable energy for the region.
• In the NPT context, all NPT states parties should consider steps that could pave the way toward implementing the 1995 Middle East resolution, such as convening a conference to explore the conditions necessary for achieving a zone in the Middle East free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and appointing a standing NPT body to follow-up intersessionally and support efforts toward these ends.

**Recommendations for the Iranian nuclear situation**

• Within the United States and the E3 countries, opinion leaders and the public need to educate themselves and vigorously challenge the prevailing consensus among most political and media elites that Iran is either arming itself with nuclear weapons, or is on the verge of doing so.
• Iranian leaders can exhibit more genuine cooperation with the IAEA and transparency around their uranium enrichment programme. Instead of belatedly disclosing new programmes, Iran’s government needs to exercise good faith in informing the Agency as soon as a decision to proceed with construction is taken. Whether or not such late disclosure is “technically” consistent with prior agreements, Iran’s situation is beyond such fine lines and its leaders must exhibit good faith.
• The United States and Iran need to continue engaging in direct talks without preconditions and with the participation of European and Russian negotiators, to
achieve a result that is consistent with national rights under the IAEA.

- Iran should reaffirm its prior Non-Aligned Movement statements and its official and secular commitments to forswear atomic weapons and promote regional and universal nuclear disarmament.
- The cycle of sanctions premised upon Iran’s pursuit of nuclear enrichment should be suspended.
- The IAEA must remain technically neutral, employ sound expertise, and resist efforts to expand its jurisdiction based upon influence by the declared nuclear weapon states.
- The US and Iran should take steps to de-militarize the Persian Gulf, particularly in the Strait of Tiran.
- The legal non-proliferation regime, and the NPT in particular, must be rigorously examined to address the permanence of nuclear weapon institutions and to discount the value of such weapons in international relations.
- Southeast and South Asian nations, without exception, should commit to a specific programme to defuse nuclear tensions and avoid a catastrophic arms race, accompanied by a commitment by the nuclear superpowers to honour such programmes and not introduce nuclear weapons in the region or sponsor/assist local nations to stockpile theirs.

**Recommendations for changing conceptions of security and nuclear weapons**

- Governments and NGOs should make nuclear disarmament the leading edge of a global trend towards demilitarization and redirection of military expenditures to meet human and environmental needs.
- The financial and human resources currently used to develop and maintain nuclear weapons systems should be used instead to meet social and economic needs consistent with the United Nations Millennium Development Goals.
- Only a comprehensive view of disarmament based on human security will lead to progress toward an equitable and secure nuclear weapon free world. The concept of security should be reframed at every level of society and government, with a premium on universal human and ecological security, multilateralism, and a commitment to cooperative, nonviolent means of conflict resolution. Civil society should actively seek to create a new discourse for nuclear abolition advocacy that illuminates the relationship between nuclear weapons and the structures that maintain them and that identifies the benefits of nuclear weapons. Governments should reframe their approach to disarmament, employing a humanitarian perspective rather than a military one.
- Nuclear disarmament activists should link their efforts with those of activists working on a broad range of issues to draw a complete picture of security, peace, and justice, forging a stronger, more unified call for human and ecological security.
- NGOs should call on governments, the UN Security Council, and civil society to report on ways and means for implementing Article 26 of the UN Charter.
- All governments should contribute data annually to the UN Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditure and the UN Register for Conventional Arms and constructively participate in efforts to enhance and upgrade both instruments.
- All government and civil society representatives should consider gender issues in their deliberations and use the tools of gender analysis to reform traditional behaviours and values expressed in negotiations and discussions on nuclear weapons.
- All governments should implement UN Security Council resolution 1325, including through increasing the participation by women at all decision-making levels, particularly in institutions and bodies dealing with security and disarmament.

**Recommendations on missiles, missile “defence”, and space weapons**

- The United States should abandon its quest to maintain long-term military supremacy through modernization and development of missiles and other strategic delivery systems, anti-missile systems, and possible deployment of space-based weapon systems. As a starting point, the United States should re-join the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
- All governments should support the establishment of international controls on delivery systems and anti-missile systems as part of a global process of reducing and eliminating nuclear forces, banning weapons in space, limiting strategic weapons generally, and implementing a policy of “non-offensive defence”.
- To this end, governments should pursue a global treaty controlling missiles, and, as an interim step, explore a missile flight test ban, which would prevent new missile designs and limit modification of traditional technology.
- Governments should work with commercial and civilian space operators to develop best-practice “rules of the road” for outer space activities. They should also commit to transparency- and confidence-building measures guiding space activities while simultaneously discussing the nuts and bolts of a legally-binding treaty that would prohibit the weaponization of outer space.
### Acronym decoder

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti-Ballistic Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>BTWC</td>
<td>Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention</td>
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<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty</td>
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<td>CWC</td>
<td>Chemical Weapons Convention</td>
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<td>Democratic People's Republic of Korea</td>
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<td>E3</td>
<td>France, Germany, United Kingdom</td>
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<td>E3+3</td>
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<td>FM(C)T</td>
<td>Fissile Materials (Cut-off) Treaty</td>
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<td>HEU</td>
<td>Highly Enriched Uranium</td>
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<td>Intercontinental Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>Women's International League for Peace and Freedom</td>
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<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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### Key resources during the Review Conference

- **Reaching Critical Will:** [www.reachingcriticalwill.org](http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org)

  *NPT News in Review:* daily newsletter produced during the NPT Review Conference
  
  *All statements, working papers, reports, and other primary documents and information*
  
  *Online calendar of events, updated in real time*

- **International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN):** [www.icanw.org](http://www.icanw.org)

  *Ideas for promoting a nuclear weapons convention*

- **Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy:** [www.acronym.org.uk](http://www.acronym.org.uk)

  *Daily blogging from the Review Conference*
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